Issue Preclusion in Products Liability by Madden, M. Stuart
Pace Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 1 Fall 1990 Article 3
September 1990
Issue Preclusion in Products Liability
M. Stuart Madden
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
M. Stuart Madden, Issue Preclusion in Products Liability, 11 Pace L. Rev. 87 (1990)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/3
Issue Preclusion in Products Liability
M. Stuart Maddent
I. Introduction
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel,' is one of
several doctrines intended to secure finality in dispute resolu-
tion.2 When raised between or among parties, or their privies,
who were bound by an earlier judgment' on a similar subject
matter,4 issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating an
issue necessarily and finally decided in the earlier action. When
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., University of Pennsylva-
nia; M.A., London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center.1. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments and a growing number of contemporary
decisions demonstrate the preference for the term "issue preclusion" over the older usage
"collateral estoppel." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 26-29 (1982); See, e.g.,
Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.N.J. 1989) (citations omitted)
("[T]he terms 'claim preclusion' and 'issue preclusion' will be used. The term claim pre-
clusion replaces res judicata; the term issue preclusion replaces collateral estoppel.").
2. A primary list of such common law and procedural devices includes the doctrine
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, from which the rule of issue preclusion derives; the
rules liberalizing amendment of pleadings; the constructive conformance of pleadings
with claims proved at trial; the rules of permissive and compulsory joinder of parties;
and the rules governing class actions and those giving structure to multi-district litiga-
tion. Cf. Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing issue preclusion
as a sanction availrble under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for willful or bad faith
noncompliance with discovery requests).
3. In such circumstances, "mutuality" is said to exist between the parties to the
earlier action and the parties of the later suit in which issue preclusion is asserted.
4. Issue identity, and not subject matter similarity, is the gravamen of issue preclu-
sion. Where, however, nonmutual issue preclusion is asserted, the party opponent's op-
portunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the earlier action can be determinative in
resolving the appropriateness of reliance upon the earlier disposition. An arguably iden-
tical issue decided in an earlier action on a quite different subject matter will bolster the
opponent's argument that the prior suit provided a distinguishable opportunity and
lesser incentive to litigate the issue in question.
5. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich.
1990) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that an actual and necessary deter-
mination of an issue by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive in subsequent
cases based upon a different cause of action but involving a party to the prior litiga-
tion.") (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)); Goodson v.
1
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:87
raised by a party who played no role in the earlier adjudication,6
the court may estop litigation of an issue where, balancing the
goal of judicial economy against the consideration of fairness to
the parties, it concludes that the issue has already been fully
and finally determined.
Modern application of issue preclusion is dated from the
two Supreme Court decisions in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v.
University of Illinois Foundations and Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore.9 Blonder-Tongue marked the Supreme Court's abandon-
ment of party mutuality as a prerequisite for defensive issue
preclusion, 10 and eight years later Parklane Hosiery approved
offensive application of nonmutual preclusion.1"
Review of the policies underlying issue preclusion in prod-
McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 195, 443 N.E.2d 978, 981 (1983):
Case law in Ohio concerning the general doctrine of res judicata has long ago
established the general principle that material facts or questions which were in
issue in a former suit, and were there judicially determined by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, are conclusively settled by a judgment therein so far as concerns
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them.
2 Ohio St. 3d at 195, 443 N.E.2d at 981; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determina-
tion is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim.").
6. Issue preclusion absent complete commonality between the earlier suit's parties
or their privies and the parties to the later suit is described as "nonmutual." See Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979).
7. E.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1990):
The doctrine of mutuality has been eroded, and a defendant may now preclude a
nonparty to the previous suit from contesting an issue a plaintiff in the prior suit
has already litigated and lost if the nonparty plaintiff has had a full and fair op-
portunity to be heard on the issue.
Id. at 746 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 549 A.2d 437 (App. Div. 1988):
[Clollateral estoppel is a rule of efficiency - a principle which seeks to promote
efficient justice by avoiding the relitigation of matters which have been fully and
fairly litigated and fully and fairly disposed of. Its preclusive effect will always be
efficient in a narrow sense of judicial economy, but it will only be just when the
criteria of full and fair determination of precisely the same issues have been met.
Its application "necessarily rest[s] on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity."
Id. at 166, 549 A.2d at 439 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971)).
8. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
9. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
10. 402 U.S. at 327.
11. 439 U.S. at 323; see infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/3
ISSUE PRECLUSION
ucts liability suits, and the litigation experience therewith, in-
vites these propositions:
(1) Certain classes of products liability actions are more
suited to issue preclusion than are others. For example, a design,
warning, or formulation claim, in which the claimant's conduct,
knowledge or expertise is logically probative of the degree of
risk, is less suited to application of issue preclusion than is a
claim in which such evidence is wholly irrelevant or only margin-
ally relevant.
(2) Granting issue preclusive effect to certain quasi-judicial
proceedings often values judicial economy over fairness to the
opponent.
(3) Many decisions too readily find privity, and consequent
issue preclusion, against parties whose relationship to an earlier
claim is either derivative,12 or based upon limited contractual
objectives," exalting judicial economy over the interest of fair-
ness to the opponent."
II. Discussion
A. Underlying Policy Considerations
The "very basis of the rule""' of issue preclusion has been
described as "confidence in the first outcome."1 6 The doctrine's
axial coordinates are judicial economy and fairness,1 7 against the
backdrop of the due process clauses of the fifth" and fourteenth
12. For example, a spouse's claim in loss of consortium.
13. For example, the reciprocal obligations set forth in a policy of liability insurance.
14. For the purposes of this discussion, "proponent" means the party asserting that
litigation of an issue should be precluded by a prior judgment, while "opponent" means
the party against whom preclusion is asserted.
15. Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 168, 549 A.2d 437, 440 (App.
Div. 1988).
16. Id.; cf. 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416,
at 142 (1981) ("The dangers of issue preclusion are as apparent as its virtues. The cen-
tral danger lies in the simple but devastating fact that the first litigated determination of
an issue may be wrong.").
17. Referring to offensive use of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court in Parklane
Hosiery, described its "dual purpose" as that of "protecting litigants from the burden of
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
326 (1979).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1990]
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amendments,19 and the seventh amendment.2 0 When the parties
to the second litigation were also parties, or privies of the par-
ties, to the first litigation, "mutuality" is said to exist.2 The pro-
portionate and relational evaluation of judicial economy and
fairness to the litigants should be seen schematically as three
equivalent sectors within a single circle:
Graph 1
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. It provides that:
[I]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right [of] trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
Id.
21. See Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978
(1983):
There being the general requisite of an identity of persons and parties, or
their privies, within the prior proceeding in order for the judgment or decree to
operate as an estoppel, strangers to such a judgment or decree will not be affected
thereby. For all practical purposes, the mutuality rule is coextensive with the re-
quirement that the plea of res judicata is available only to a party to the judg-
ment and to his privies.
Id. at 196, 443 N.E.2d at 982.
[Vol. 11:87
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For application of issue preclusion where there is de jure or
de facto mutuality between the parties,2 the equivalent dimen-
sions of the above sectors reflect the roughly coequal significance
courts accord their respective consideration. 3 What about the
application of issue preclusion on behalf of or against a party
who has not had his "day in court" on the issue? When a party
to the second action was a stranger to the first, one considers the
three-sector analysis between the same parties or their privies,
with one significant addition: a heightened solicitude for the op-
ponent's earlier opportunity and incentive to litigate. In these
circumstances, evaluation of the opponent's opportunity and in-
centive to litigate transcends the interests of judicial economy
and fairness to the proponent. 2' This evaluation is schematically
represented in Graph 2.
Where there exists conventional privity 5 between and
22. De jure mutuality exists where the later action involves the former's parties or
privies of those parties. De facto mutuality exists in those limited circumstances where a
current party, though neither party nor privy of a party in the earlier action, enjoyed a
relationship of control or capacity to control the earlier action that justifies binding it by
issues resolved in the earlier outcome.
23. Where appropriate, issue preclusion serves the goal of judicial economy by pre-
serving the integrity of any full and fair resolution of an issue in any future dispute
between the initial parties or privies of those parties. Fairness to the proponent is mani-
fest in not requiring him to relitigate an issue on which he has previously prevailed.
Fairness to the party opposing preclusive effect of the prior judgment may be more accu-
rately described as absence of unfairness. Mutual issue preclusion works no unfairness on
the opponent where, examining the identity of the claim and the context of the initial
adjudication, the reasonable opposing party would be prompted to vigorously litigate the
issue. Where mutuality exists, therefore, proper invocation of issue preclusion permits a
party, or a party's privy, only one bite at the apple.
24. Generally, the opponent's marginal or nonexistent opportunity or incentive to
litigate the issue in the prior litigation would lessen the effect of de novo litigation upon
the policy of judicial economy because one or both parties to the subsequent action had
not had an earlier actual or nominal day in court on the same issue. Similarly, the party-
opponent's inadequate earlier opportunity to litigate this issue against the current pro-
ponent undercuts the proponent's argument that mustering prosecution or defense of the
claim in the later action is an unfair burden.
25. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the Supreme Court defined
privity as including those
for whose benefit and at whose direction a cause of action is litigated .... [O]ne
who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect
his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of
some interest of his own... is as much bound ... as he would be if he had been a
party to the record.
Id. at 154 (quoting Souffront v. Campagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 487 (1910)).
5
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among parties to the prior litigation and the current one, the
issue preclusion questions to be resolved by the court are rela-
tively limited. First, is the issue before the tribunal identical to
that litigated in the earlier action? Second, was that issue finally
and necessarily decided in the earlier action? When the parties
to the second action are not mutual, the court must evaluate
three additional factors: current party de facto privity with an
earlier litigant; full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior proceeding; and comparable incentive to litigate.2
Graph 2
In products liability claims, application of the issue identity,
ruling finality, and ruling necessity criteria resemble those pur-
26. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-33 (1979) (relevant factors
for determining whether plaintiff can invoke estoppel offensively include: whether plain-
tiff could have effected joinder in the first action; whether application of estoppel would
be inconsistent with previous decisions; and whether procedural opportunities available
to defendant were unavailable in the first action); see infra notes 111-121 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 11:87
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sued in other civil litigation, except for markings distinctive to
products liability claims. In certain civil subject matters (for ex-
ample, title to land, existence of a contract, patentable inven-
tion) the facts are arguably immutable, if not the inferences to
be derived therefrom.2 7 Therein resides the logic of reposing
confidence in, or at least preclusive effect to, the resolution by
the first court.
In products liability actions, however, factual volatility8
and doctrinal distinctions" often militate against the fairness of
giving preclusive effect to prior issue resolution. To select only
the subject of adverse reactions to pharmaceuticals, use and user
environment-specific questions should often preclude adoption
of collateral estoppel. The question of whether "one individual
might have an adverse reaction whereas another individual
might not" differs qualitatively from the issues that might, for
27. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971). The Court describes its "consistent view ... that the holder of a patent should
not be insulated from the assertion of defenses and thus allowed to exact royalties for
the use of an idea that is not in fact patentable or that is beyond the scope of the patent
monopoly granted," and concluded that nonmutual defensive issue preclusion should be
available to a party "facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been
declared invalid." Id. at 349-50.
28. For example, Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443
N.E.2d 978 (1983), held that plaintiffs representing a four-year-old child injured when
her foot slipped under a riding mower should not be permitted to assert nonmutual of-
fensive collateral estoppel against the manufacturer, based upon an earlier judgment
finding liability, for negligent design. The court found that
there were two totally separate accidents, with two different models of a riding
lawnmower manufactured in different years by appellant manufacturer; there
were different operators of the equipment with perhaps totally different mechani-
cal capabilities; different terrain and weather conditions .... [W]e hold that non-
mutual collateral estoppel may not be used to preclude the relitigation of design
issues relating to mass-produced products when the injuries arise out of distinct
underlying incidents.
Id. at 204, 443 N.E.2d at 988.
29. For example, in a minority of jurisdictions, plaintiff's prima facie case in strict
tort liability does not require a showing of an unreasonably dangerous condition of the
product, and upon certain proof by plaintiff, effects a shifting of the burden of proof to
defendant to show that the attributes of a particular design or formulation choice out-
weigh the risks. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978). See generally Schwartz & Mahshigian, Offensive Collateral Estoppel: It Will
Not Work in Product Liability, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 583, 588 n.29 (1986) ("Decisions
on virtually every aspect of product liability law illustrate great variations among the
States and constant changes of legal rules within a State." (quoting S. Rep. No. 670, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982))).
1990]
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example, be resolved in a negligence action arising from the
same automobile accident.3 0 Consider as well these hypothetical
cases: (1) the class action representative plaintiff seeking Rule
23(b) 31 certification in a toxic tort action even after a court
found with respect to an earlier class petition that plaintiffs'
damage evidence was too varied to permit certification; (2) the
defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer's effort to avoid preclu-
sive effect of an earlier judgment that its product caused limb
reduction in newborns, relying now upon newly discovered scien-
tific evidence disproving causation; or (3) the successful workers'
compensation claimant now suing the asbestos manufacturer
and attempting to avoid the preclusive effect of an earlier ad-
ministrative conclusion that the claimant could not identify the
products of the individual asbestos manufacturers.3 2
B. Elements of Issue Preclusion
1. Generally
Taken together, res judicata and issue preclusion "prohibit
relitigation of claims and issues decided in a prior proceeding."33
Issue preclusion bars parties from relitigating an issue that was
30. Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 218, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 125 (1975) (quoting
Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc., 534 P.2d 173, 178 n.1 (Ore. 1975) (en banc)). In Vin-
cent, the court refused to grant issue preclusive effect to an earlier judgment that Parke-
Davis' pharmaceutical Quadrigen was marketed with inadequate testing where plaintiff
in the latter action offered only "conclusory" expert testimony "that the infant plaintiff's
injuries were probably secondary to a DTP injection and that a bad vaccine would cause
neurological shock . . . ." Id. at 220, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
32. See Glow, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Arizona: Fair Litigation vs. Judicial
Economy, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 535, 543 (1988).
33. Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.N.J. 1989). Parklane
Hosiery distinguishes the two doctrines:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit
bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the
second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior
suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome
of the first action.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (citing 1B J. MooRE, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE V 0.405(1) at 622-24 (2d ed. 1974)). See generally Note, Claim Preclusion
in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second Suits, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1989 n.1 & 1991-92 (1990).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/3
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necessarily litigated in an earlier action,3 4 and poses the question
of "whether a party has had his day in court on an issue, rather
than whether he has had his day in court on that issue against a
particular litigant." 85 Even a litigant's apparent prior "day in
court" on an issue will not, however, automatically preclude re-
litigation of an issue where the "practicalities" and "details" of
the prior proceeding suggest that the party against whom pre-
clusion is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the factum probandum before the second tribunal. 6 The
vessel for the common law preference for finality in dispute reso-
lution, issue preclusion may apply to evidentiary facts, ultimate
facts, or law.3 7
34. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 29, at 583.
35. Eason, 706 F. Supp. at 316 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 191, 380
A.2d 1128, 1138 (1977)) (quoting McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 38 N.J. 156, 161, 183 A.2d 74,
76 (1962)). See Sucher v. Kutscher's Country Club, 113 A.D.2d 928, 493 N.Y.S.2d 829
(1985), for an example of an action initiated by a country club patron who fell from her
wheelchair and was injured while using a chair lifting machine. In resolving the issue
preclusion implications of subsequent third-party and fourth-party complaints by the
country club and the vendor against the lift manufacturer, the court stated the general
rule that
[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of an issue
where it is found that (1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to one
which was necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the litigant against
whom preclusion is sought in the present proceeding had a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
Id. at 930, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
36. Zweig v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 222 N.J. Super. 306, 311-12, 536 A.2d 1280, 1282-
83 (App. Div. 1988).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 338 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ("It is well established that collat-
eral estoppel embraces matters both of fact and of law." (citing 1B J. MOORE, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.442, at 3851 (2d ed. 1982))). Examples abound of related if not
identical evidentiary treatment of sworn prior statements, judgments based thereon, or
judicially-accepted facts. Party admissions, even where later withdrawn, will not operate
to estop the party from taking an inconsistent position, although the prior admission is
admissible both as impeachment and as evidence of the facts stated. E.g., Contractor
Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1085 (7th Cir. 1981) (in
action for breach of contract and fraud, it was error to exclude from evidence portions of
plaintiff's original complaint, later amended); Raulie v. United States, 400 F.2d 487 (10th
Cir. 1968):
When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion ceases to be a
conclusive judicial admission; but it still remains as a statement once seriously
made by an authorized agent, and as such it is competent evidence of the facts
stated, though controvertible, like any other extrajudicial admission made by a
party or his agent.
9
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For a prior judgment to have issue preclusive effect, it is not
necessary that it have been submitted to the fact finder. A
court's resolution of an issue as a matter of law may constitute
full and fair litigation of the issue. In Day v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft,"5 plaintiff's state court action against the au-
tomobile manufacturer followed an adverse federal court ruling
on the design and failure to warn claims pertaining to the ab-
sence of shoulder harnesses.3 9 Affirming the state trial court's
summary judgment motion in favor of the manufacturer and im-
porter, the Pennsylvania Superior Court commented: "[I]t was
not necessary in order to be 'litigated' that the issues have been
determined by the jury.' 0 Even issues resolved by trial court
consolidation of claims or elimination of claims considered re-
dundant under state law may be considered fully litigated for
the purposes of subsequent issue preclusion."
An estoppel resulting from issues determined in a prior
judgment is available to either a plaintiff or a defendant in a
subsequent suit.'2 In most jurisdictions, the rule can be applied
offensively to prohibit a defendant from relitigating issues de-
cided in a prior case, even where the earlier action was brought
400 F.2d at 526 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Car-
penter, 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1929)).
A court of general jurisdiction may accord comparable treatment to prior party ad-
missions even when the earlier statement was entered in a more limited forum, such as a
workers' compensation proceeding. E.g., Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 306 Inl.
App. 430, 438-41, 28 N.E.2d 743, 746-47 (1940) (manager's earlier statement that em-
ployee had been injured on the job was held admissible in later wrongful death proceed-
ing in which defendant employer claimed that decedent was acting as either an indepen-
dent contractor or was on a frolic unrelated to employment).
38. 464 A.2d 1313, 318 Pa. Super. 225 (1983).
39. In Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 451 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978), the court ruled that the absence of shoulder re-
straints "was both obvious to the naked eye of anyone who made even a cursory inspec-
tion of the vehicle, and was specifically referred to in the owner's manual." 451 F. Supp.
at 6. The court also ruled as a matter of law that "the danger inherent in riding in the
front seat of a rear-engine type vehicle [was] not a latent limitation requiring a warning
of the risk involved." Id.
40. 464 A.2d at 1319, 318 Pa. Super. at 238; see supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
41. See Day, 464 A.2d at 1319 n.2, 318 Pa. Super. at 238 n.2 ("The cause of action
for breach of warranty has also been 'litigated'. It was eliminated prior to trial in favor of
the cause based on absolute liability.").
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/3
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by a: different plaintiff.4" Defensive application of issue preclu-
sion permits defendant to preclude even a new plaintiff's reliti-
gation of previously decided issues.""
The virtues of issue finality are both jurisprudentially and
culturally grounded.45 Less abstractly, upon satisfaction of cer-
tain conditions of issue commonality, necessity of determination
and amenability to earlier litigation, courts and scholarly au-
thorities are in agreement that issue preclusion is compatible
with traditional notions of due process.'"
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 27 states
the general rule precluding parties from relitigating "an issue of
fact or law" that was "actually litigated and determined" by
"valid" and "final" judgment.47 Preclusive effect is only given
43. Thus, issue preclusion might be properly applied on behalf of multiple claimants
against a single defendant such as when many persons are killed in a single aviation
accident. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIAmLrrIY § 55:9 (T. Travers, 3d
ed. 1987) (citing Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc., 271 Or. 712, 534 P.2d 173 (1975));
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 196, 443 N.E.2d 978, 982 n.7
(1983) (the court, declining itself to adopt nonmutual issue preclusion, cited decisions in
other jurisdictions where the requirement of mutuality has been dropped).
44. E.g., Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1203 (Wyo. 1989) (prior
jury verdict finding that nonparty driver's negligence was sole proximate cause of acci-
dent collaterally estopped plaintiff from asserting warranty and strict liability claims
against the automobile dealer and the manufacturer).
45. Literature is suffused with affirmations of the desirability of symmetry between
and predictability among decisions upon identical issues. E.g., S. JOHNSON, THE IDLER,
no. 39 at 57 (1758) ("He is no wise man that will quit a certainty for an uncertainty.").
46. See generally Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 328-29 (1971).
47. "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); accord, Producers Dairy De-
livery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d 920, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1986):
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue previ-
ously adjudicated if: (1) the issue necessarily decided in the previous suit is identi-
cal to the issue sought to be relitigated; (2) there was a final judgment on the
merits of the previous suit; and (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted
was a party, or in privity with a party, to the previous suit.
41 Cal.3d at 910, 718 P.2d at 923, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
Another conventional formulation of the elements necessary for finding issue preclu-
sion is stated in these words:
(1) [W]hether the issue to be decided is identical with the issue decided in the
prior litigation; (2) whether the prior litigation redulted in a judgment being de-
cided on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom the assertion of collateral
estoppel is being made was a party to the prior litigation; and (4) whether the
1990]
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determinations "essential to the judgment."' 8 In products liabil-
ity actions the prerequisites are largely compatible, with most
jurisdictions imposing four prerequisites:' 9 (1) both actions must
involve the identical issue;"' (2) the issue must actually have
party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate on the issues in the prior suit.
Green v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 775 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. 1989) (following Oates v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 583 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1979)).
The requirement that the issues have been "actually litigated" was affirmed in
Hughes v. Santa Fe Corp., 847 F.2d 239, 240 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting International As-
soc. of Machinists & AeroSpace Workers v. Nix, 512 F.2d 125, 132 (5th Cir. 1975)).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also Eason v. Linden Avi-
onics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311 (D.N.J. 1989):
Among the criteria to be considered before issue preclusion can be invoked
are whether: (i) the party to be estopped was a party or in privity with a party in
the prior action; (ii) the issue to be estopped is the same as that previously liti-
gated; and (iii) the issue was actually litigated (or finally resolved) and necessary
to the prior judgment.
706 F. Supp. at 316.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states that "[slubsequent action between
the parties" preserves the common law predisposition to confine issue preclusion to sub-
sequent actions between the parties or their privies. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 27 (1982).
49. Decisions differ on the issue of whether state law or federal common law applies
to the preclusive effect of a prior diversity judgment. Courts concluding that federal pre-
clusion law applies note that "the rules of claim and issue preclusion define the finality
of the federal judgment and are designed to protect that judgment." Johnson v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 689 F. Supp. 170, 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); see, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982):
The choice of law question is supposedly of significance because, according to ap-
pellants, Texas strictly adheres to the doctrine of mutuality, i.e., neither party can
use a prior judgment to estop another unless both parties were bound by the prior
judgment. If this view of Texas law is correct, the plaintiffs here, none of whom
were parties to [Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)] would of course be unable to invoke col-
lateral estoppel.
We need not resolve the question of whether appellant's view of Texas law of
collateral estoppel is correct, however, since the district court was bound under
the law of our circuit to apply federal law .... [Flederal res judicata principles
apply in federal tort claim actions in order to preserve the integrity of federal
court judgments, and that this rationale applies equally to diversity cases.
Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
Other courts consider preclusion law to be substantive, requiring application of state
preclusion law in diversity actions. E.g., Costanini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d
1199, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982); Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio Indus.,
655 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1981).
50. Thus, for example, the issues raised by an asbestos worker's claims against an
asbestos manufacturer, where the defendant manufacturer prevailed for want of proof
that the worker suffered from asbestosis, were held not identical to (and therefore did
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/3
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been litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination of the
issue in the first action must have been a necessary part of the
judgment therein; and (4) the party against whom preclusion is
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.5 1
An absolute due process prerequisite to the application of collat-
eral estoppel is that the party asserting preclusion must estab-
lish that the identical issue was (1) actually litigated; (2) di-
rectly determined; and (3) essential to the judgment in a prior
action. 1
Where it is foreseeable that the issue could subsequently be
utilized collaterally, and where the parties to the first action
have had the incentive to litigate the action "fully and vigor-
ously,""5 issue preclusive effect may be given the judgment of
any tribunal having subject matter jurisdiction over the claim,
including an administrative tribunal. 4 Evaluation of a party's
earlier prior opportunity and incentive to litigate looks beyond
the presence or absence of formal or nominal opportunity, and is
agreed generally to require examination of the particular litiga-
tion context in which the earlier action was tried or judgment
entered. Review may be had of such factors as (1) the size of the
claim; (2) extent of the litigation; (3) availability of any new evi-
dence; (4) differences in applicable law; and (5) existence of
prior inconsistent verdicts. 55
not preclude) the claimant's later action against his employer claiming that his employer,
Celotex, with knowledge exposed him to hazardous asbestos products and failed to cor-
rect the hazardous conditions. Walker v. GAF Corp., No. 88-3380 (6th Cir. Sept. 25,
1989) (LEXIS, GenFed library, USAPP).
51. See supra note 39.
52. A further and implicit requirement is that the authority upon which the earlier
judgment is grounded should remain viable doctrine in the jurisdiction of the later ac-
tion. Cf. Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 891 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1989) (issue
preclusive effect inappropriate where prior judgment upon which lower court relied in
barring relitigation of issue was reversed by an appellate court five days prior to lower
court judgment).
53. See 4 AMERICAN LAW PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 55:12, at 16 (T. Travers, 3d ed.
1987).
54. Cf. Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1989) (employee's stipulation in
earlier workmen's compensation case that employee was ridesharing with supervisor at
the time of the accident precluded relitigation of supervisor's "scope of employment" in
subsequent vicarious liability action against employer).
For a criticism of granting issue preclusive effect to certain administrative determi-
nations, see supra notes 201-218 and accompanying text.
55. Regarding the existence of prior inconsistent verdicts, it is held uniformly that
1990]
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2. Issue Identity
Whether the claimed issue preclusion involves the same par-
ties or their privies, or one or more new parties, the proponent
must demonstrate the substantial identity of the present issue
with the issue already decided." The court's analysis of what
issues were necessarily decided may reference not only the spe-
cific findings entered, including any pertinent jury interrogato-
ries, but also plaintiff's own expressions of issues."'
Many obstacles are placed in the path of a proponent's
proof of issue identity. A paradigm of the proponent's challenge
can be found in the litigation following Borel v. Fibreboard Pa-
per Products Corp.s In Borel, the plaintiff, an industrial worker
who contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma, brought suit
against a number of insulation manufacturers, alleging that the
defendants were strictly liable for failing to warn about the dan-
gers of long-term exposure to asbestos. Based on the evidence
presented, the jury found the manufacturers were liable because
divergent decisions reached in earlier actions militate strongly against granting issue
preclusive effect to the prior decision advanced by the issue preclusion proponent. E.g.,
Deviner v. Electrolux Motor, 844 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1988):
In [Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986)], the jury
decided the question under the Extended Liability Doctrine in favor of the plain-
tiff Nettles. But in the case at bar the jury to whom that issue was submitted
decided in favor of defendants. It would be an unusually ingenious quirk in our
system of justice, which attaches special sanctity to jury verdicts, if it permitted
appellant to circumvent the unfavorable jury verdict against him by applying via a
doctrine of estoppel the verdict of a different jury in a different case.
Id. at 774.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment a (1982):
Issues affected. The rule of this section applies only to preclude relitigation of
issues that the party would have been precluded from relitigating with his original
adversary. Accordingly, preclusion may be imposed only if, as stated in § 27, the
issue was the same as that involved in the present action and was actually liti-
gated and essential to a prior judgment that is valid and final.
Id.
57. E.g., Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 821 (1966). In Hurley, the court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on plaintiff's
negligence count (Count II), and found that issues necessarily resolved by the negligence
count precluded plaintiff's relitigation of its implied warranty of merchantability counts
(Count I). The court reasoned that, "there was an identity of factual allegations between
counts I and II. The only substantive difference between the counts lay in their respec-
tive theories of action. . . . Proof of the same defect was essential to recovery under
either theory of the complaint." Id.
58. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
[Vol. 11:87
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they failed to warn about the foreseeable dangers associated
with exposure to asbestos. Ten years later, different plaintiffs
brought an action in which they sought to utilize Borel to pre-
clude the litigation of the issue of causation. In Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.,59 the trial court held that Borel estab-
lished as a matter of law that asbestos is a substance that can
produce asbestosis and mesothelioma, and that no warnings
were issued by any of the asbestos insulators prior to 1964. As a
consequence, the trial court held, "the plaintiff need not prove
that defendants either knew or should have known of the dan-
gerous propensities of their products and therefore should have
warned consumers of these dangers, defendants being precluded
from showing otherwise."60 The Fifth Circuit reversed, conclud-
ing that Borel did not necessarily decide the state of manufac-
turer knowledge as to the dangers of asbestos exposure." Specif-
ically, Borel did not resolve as a matter of fact that "all
manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation products had a
duty to warn as of 1936, and all failed to warn adequately after
1964."' 2 A proponent's failure to demonstrate issue commonality
was also evidenced in Walker v. GAF Corp.," where claimant's
intentional tort action against an employer followed an adverse
determination in plaintiff's negligence and strict products liabil-
ity claims.64
59. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 336-37.
61. Id. at 345.
62. Id. The court further explained that: "[Olur opinion in Borel merely approved
of the various ways the jury could have come to a conclusion concerning strict liability
for failure to warn. We did not say that any of the specific alternatives that the jury had
before it were necessary or essential to its verdict." Id.
63. No. 88-3380 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 1989) (LEXIS, GenFed library, USAPP).
64. Id. at 4. The Walker court stated:
We believe the district court improperly granted summary judgment on the
basis of collateral estoppel because Walker's bald claim that Celotex, his former
employer, committed an intentional tort does not necessarily raise the precise is-
sue of whether or not Walker suffers from asbestosis, which was the issue raised
and actually-litigated in the prior proceeding ....
Id.
For an example highlighting the effect of the context of the earlier litigation upon
the court's assessment of the opponent's earlier opportunity and incentive to litigate, see
McCarthy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (D. Mass. 1980) (offensive
issue preclusion was not applied against defendant manufacturers of asbestos products
because they could not have foreseen the advent of mass asbestos litigation at the time
1990]
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The opponent's argument that new evidence militates
against the estoppel effect of a prior judgment has been inter-
preted to include new evidence in light of increased scientific or
medical knowledge of epidemiology or causation. For example,
in Zweig v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,"5 the defendant, a manufacturer
of the anti-miscarriage drug Delalutin, avoided the issue preclu-
sive effect of an adverse prior jury verdict by showing that more
recent scientific inquiry and FDA examination "cast doubt"
upon prior findings of fact implicating the drug in newborn limb
reduction."'
In products liability, special issue preclusion questions are
raised by the practice of pleading multiple tort and warranty
claims arising from the same facts. For example, in products lia-
bility actions alleging the seller's negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict tort liability, aspects of plaintiffs proof on the negli-
gence count are virtually indistinguishable from what plaintiff
must prove in her strict liability count. Thus plaintiff's proof of
defect in negligence imports proof that the product was sold in
an unsafe and unreasonably dangerous condition. 7 In most
the prior case was tried); see also Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
Where arguable distinctions exist between the issue previously litigated and the one
for which a party seeks preclusion, one factor to be evaluated is whether there exists "a
substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the second pro-
ceeding and that advanced in the first." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 com-
ment c (1982).
65. 222 N.J. Super. 306, 536 A.2d 1280 (App. Div. 1988).
66. Id. at 312, 536 A.2d at 1283. The Zweig court noted:
The record discloses that studies of Delalutin, conducted after the Utah verdict,
have absolved the drug of the harmful effects alleged here. There is now biological
evidence that the drug cannot cause limb reduction. The FDA, which in 1977 had
warned against using Delalutin during the first trimester of pregnancy, is now con-
sidering whether to retract that warning in light of a recommendation from its
Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee that Delalutin does not
appear to be harmful. Later scientific discoveries that cast doubt on prior findings
of scientific facts deprive those earlier findings of collateral estoppel effect.
Id.
67. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965):
[negligence liability for a] manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in
the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as
involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a
purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those
whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/3
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states, proof of defect in strict tort liability requires that the
plaintiff prove that the product was sold in a defective and un-
reasonably dangerous condition."' In an implied warranty of
merchantability claim, plaintiff must prove that the product was
nonmerchantable as sold, without the necessity of showing that
the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.,
The question of whether judgment adverse to plaintiff in a
negligence claim against a manufacturer suffices to estop plain-
tiff's later claim for breach of the implied warranty. of
merchantability was before the court in Hurley. v. Beech Air-
craft Corp.70 There a personal representative's wrongful death
action alleged the defective condition of the aircraft's left wing.
The plaintiff's original implied warranty claim was dismissed for
lack of privity, and judgment was entered for defendant on the
negligence count. On appeal, plaintiff's warranty claim was rein-
stated, the court and the parties agreeing that in Indiana no
privity needs be shown for a claim in implied warranty.71 Never-
theless, the court affirmed defendant's judgment on both claims,
concluding that the adverse judgment in negligence precluded
plaintiff's claim in implied warranty. The court reasoned that
the prior findings of no defect on the negligence claim were-
equally dispositive of plaintiff's required showing of defect for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 2
for which it is supplied.
Id.
68. See id. at § 402A.
69. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). See generally Note, Strict Liability and Warranty in
Consumer Protection: The Broader Protection of the UCC In Cases Involving Economic
Loss, Used Goods, and Nondangerous Defective Goods, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347
(1982).
70. 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 821 (1966).
71. 355 F.2d at 519.
72. Id. at 520. The court stated:
Proof of the same defect was essential to recovery under either theory of the
complaint.
Plaintiff's position is that in trial on the breach of warranty, they would have
only to show that there was an in-flight structural failure of a brand new aircraft,
that failure being identified as the separation of the wing while the plane was
apparently in routine normal flight. This position fails to take into account the
findings of fact of the trial court in the negligence action ... which attribute the
structural failure to excessive forces upon the plane and which state that the sepa-
ration did not occur during the normal flight of the aircraft, but after it had de-
1990]
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Ordinarily, however, a court will not grant preclusive effect
to a prior issue determination upon proponent's simple showing
that the issue resolved was within the constellation of claims
raised in a multi-count action. For example, it has been held
that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a contractor's neg-
ligence claim against the architect for a municipal project did
not purport to resolve issues raised in the contractor's subse-
quent claim in breach of contract against the municipality. 7
Nonetheless, there is agreement that a party's failure, as a mat-
ter of fact or as a matter of law, to prevail on an issue common
to more than one of its claims will operate to estop relitigation
of the same issue in a subsequent suit, even when the issue per-
tains to a different claim.7 4
3. Necessity and Clarity of Valid and Final Order
Pendency of the losing party's appeal of a judgment does
not alter its finality for issue preclusion purposes." Congruently,
a subsequent determination that an action was brought and re-
solved in the wrong forum will not strip the earlier action of
preclusive effect7 6
To be accorded preclusive effect, a judgment must have nec-
essarily decided the issue. Accordingly, a reviewing court's later
scended to 7,000 feet from 11,000 feet in considerably less than a minute. Thus,
the fact upon which plaintiffs are compelled to base their entire breach of war-
ranty action, i.e., a defect in the aircraft, is a fact with respect to which the trial
court has already made an adverse finding.
Id. at 520-21.
73. Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 31 (1986).
The court noted: "From a review of the record, we believe that [contractor] Chaney was
entitled to produce evidence and did produce evidence which showed that the delays .in
its performance could have been caused by the [city's] plans and not by Chaney without
[architect] Kulseth necessarily being negligent as a result." Id.
74. See, e.g., supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986) (a judgment is
final for purposes of issue preclusion even where an appeal is taken, except in circum-
stances where the "appeal" actually constitutes a trial de novo); cf. Waggoner v. General
Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1204 (Wyo. 1989) (footnote omitted):
Here, the fact question of proximate cause, or more precisely "cause in fact," was
determined against appellant in the trial of his negligence claim. Although ...
appellant has appealed the negligence determination, we herein have affirmed the
district court on that claim and that judgment is now just as conclusive as if it had
not been appealed.
76. Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 753 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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observation that evidence raised a submissible jury question on
a particular matter does not mean that the particular issue was
so decided, absent evidence in the judgment or order itself 7
Issue preclusive effect will not be given where the prior or-
der is not clear.78 A court's simple statement granting defend-
ants' motions to dismiss grounded variably on lack of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and improper venue
has been held not to preclude litigation of the in personam issue
against one prevailing defendant where "[sleveral interpreta-
tions can be given" to the prior order.79
C. Application to Specific Issues, Proceedings, and Procedural
Stages
1. Jurisdiction
Prior determination of in personam jurisdiction is generally
found to preclude litigation of jurisdictional questions in a later
77. For example, in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982), the court clarified that the import of the Borel decision was only that
the jury could have grounded strict liability on the absence of a warning prior to
1964 or "could have concluded that [post-1964 and post-1966] 'cautions' were not
warnings in the sense that they adequately communicated to Borel and other in-
sulation workers knowledge of the dangers to which they were exposed .... We
did not say that any of the specific alternatives that the jury had before it were
necessary or essential to its verdict."
Id. at 345 (quoting Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1104 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)). Thus, the court concluded:
[s]ince we cannot say that Borel necessarily decided, as a matter of fact, that all
manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation products knew or should have
known of the dangers of their particular products at all relevant times, we cannot
justify the trial court's collaterally estopping the defendants from presenting evi-
dence as to the state of the art.
Id.
78. Green v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 775 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
79. Id. at 165. The court hearing the issue preclusion question stated:
The judge's order is not clear. Several interpretations can be given to the
words "Defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of venue sustained." Under the facts presented here it is impossible to determine
what the court was making reference to in its order. Magna's interpretation, that
the dismissal on the grounds of jurisdiction applied only to Magna is misleading
and ignores Montgomery Ward's assertion as to jurisdiction and the lack thereof
in its initial "Motion to Dismiss" and its later "Motion to Dismiss or Transfer"
which specifically states, "This court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter."
Accordingly, collateral estoppel presents no bar in the instant case.
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suit only where the issue of jurisdiction was resolved unambigu-
ously in the prior action and the nonprevailing party on that
issue had a full opportunity to litigate the issue.80 In Green v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 8 the court found that a prior judg-
ment dismissing a retailer's indemnification action against a saw
manufacturer did not collaterally estop subsequent judicial eval-
uation of whether there existed in personam jurisdiction over
the manufacturer. The appeal in that action originated in a per-
sonal injury suit brought against Montgomery Ward, the re-
tailer, and Magna American Corp., the manufacturer and de-
signer of the Shopsmith V Multipurpose Wood Saw. In the first
action, the trial court granted Montgomery Ward's motion to
dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of
venue, and Magna's motion to dismiss grounded on lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction and lack of venue.2 In a subsequent action
filed by the injured plaintiff against Montgomery Ward alone,
Montgomery Ward filed a third-party petition against Magna.
The trial court dismissed the third-party action on the basis of
the certified copy of the prior order.8 s
On appeal, the court referenced the conventional criteria for
issue preclusion, adding that "[c]ollateral estoppel only pertains
to those issues which were 'necessarily and unambiguously de-
cided.' "84 The court concluded that the prior dismissal of
Magna for want of in personam jurisdiction did not preclude the
retailer's current claim that jurisdiction existed in the second ac-
tion, reasoning that "Montgomery Ward was not accorded a 'full
and fair' opportunity to litigate, nor was the issue resolved in an
unambiguous fashion by the St. Louis court and no judgment
was rendered on the merits of the case."8 To Magna's argument
that the retailer had such an opportunity as it was "allied" with
Mr. Green in the original action and "should have contemplated
a third-party action or cross claim at a later date," the court
80. See, e.g., Bascom v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 395 N.W.2d 879, 885 (Iowa
1986) (dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction of earlier employee negligence action
against employer warranted dismissal of second action on the basis of issue preclusion).
81. 775 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
82. Id. at 163.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 164 (citing Burton v. State, 726 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
85. Id. at 164-65.
[Vol. 11:87
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demurred, commenting: "In the initial action both Montgomery
and Magna sought to dismiss Green's petition. Montgomery
Ward had no reason to oppose Magna's motion to dismiss.
Montgomery Ward's position was one of co-defendant and no
logical reading of the facts shows it to be allied with Green."86
Lack of finality in a prior jurisdictional judgment sufficed
for the court in Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc.87 to deny issue
preclusive effect. There, Beech Aircraft Corporation had been a
defendant in a prior state court action arising from the same
occurrence, where, the court summarized, having "an equally
strong incentive to avoid the jurisdiction of the state and federal
courts," the manufacturers "had asserted the identical personal
jurisdiction defense."88 Beech argued against granting issue
preclusive effect to the state court's interlocutory rejection of its
jurisdictional claims on the grounds that under New Jersey law
such an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss was not
"final" for issue preclusion purposes.8 9 Conceding that the state
trial court's denial of Beech's motion was not "tentative," the
federal district court nonetheless observed that as "[a] prior
state court ruling on the issue of personal jurisdiction may be
upset long after entry of judgment in federal court ....
[P]reclusion of a provisionally resolved issue would not be
appropriate. '9
2. Quasi-Judicial Determinations
It is generally accepted that when an administrative body
acts in a judicial or a quasi-judicial capacity, "the decision and
findings are entitled to finality under the doctrines of res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel.""' Arising commonly in the context of
workers' compensation proceedings and negligence or products
liability suits deriving from the same accident, it has been stated
86. Id. The court added: "It would have been unusual for Montgomery Ward to
challenge Magna's status at this point as they too sought dismissal." Id.
87. 706 F. Supp. 311 (D.N.J. 1989).
88. Id. at 316.
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id. at 318 (citation omitted).
91. Brown v. Dow Chemical Co., 875 F.2d 197, 199 (8th Cir. 1989) (Arkansas Work-
ers' Compensation Commission's finding that plaintiff failed to establish causation col-
laterally estopped his later products liability action).
1990]
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that "[c]ollateral estoppel operates between judicial and board
determinations.... [T]he relationship of court to agency [is] 'a
statutory-decisional system in which both trial court and work-
men's compensation agency are bound to accept the other's prior
adjudication .... "'92
3. Class Action Certification
In re A.H. Robbins Co.'3 raised, among other matters, the
issue preclusive effect of a prior trial court's denial of a products
liability claimant's application for class action certification. In
that action, brought by plaintiff against the product manufac-
turer's insurance carrier as joint tortfeasor, the federal appellate
court held that plaintiff's application for class action certifica-
tion in its negligence and warranty claims for punitive damages
were barred by virtue of an earlier California federal court re-
fusal to certify such a class on the grounds that plaintiff's class
failed to show the commonality, typicality, and adequate repre-
sentation requisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).'
4. Vicarious Liability
Where a claimant fails to establish liability against an em-
ployee tortfeasor, a later vicarious liability action against the
employer will be precluded.98 In other professional relationships,
however, judgment for or against one actor will not necessarily
92. Anderson-Cottonwood Disposal Serv. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
135 Cal. App. 3d 326, 332, 185 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339-40 (1982) (citations omitted). For a
criticism of granting issue preclusive effect to certain aspects of workers' compensation
proceedings, see infra notes 201-218 and accompanying text.
93. 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
94. Id.
95. E.g., Staples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1397, 235 Cal. Rptr. 1.65 (1987):
The pertinent law is as follows:".. . in actions of tort, if the defendant's responsi-
bility is necessarily dependent upon the culpability of another who was the imme-
diate actor, and who, in an action against him by the same plaintiff for the same
act, has been judged not culpable, the defendant may have the benefit of that
judgment as an estoppel .... "
Id. at 1415, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 177. (quoting Charles H. Duell, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Corp., 128 Cal. App. 376, 383, 17 P.2d 781, 784 (1932)); see also Vezina v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 665, 672, 136 Cal. Rptr. 198, 202 (1977) (plaintiff's
action against insurance company for injuries sustained in accident with vehicle operated
by carrier's employee barred by finding in earlier personal injury action that employee
was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident).
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give rise to an estoppel effect on issues in a later action. For
example, in Chaney Building Co. v. City of Tucson," the Ari-
zona Supreme Court considered a municipality's claim that a
dismissal with prejudice in a contractor's earlier claim against
the architect precluded the contractor's subsequent claim
against the city for breach of contract. The court stated: "In the
current action Tucson was sued for wrongful termination and
breach of contract; [the architect] Kulseth for negligence. We do
not believe that this was a case where Tucson's liability was sim-
ply derivative from any liability of Kulseth. ' '97
5. Discovery
A prior judgment on a discovery matter will be denied issue
preclusive effect where either, the discovery rules governing the
earlier and later discovery contests vary or the nature or scope
of the later application for discovery differs from the one earlier
decided. For example, in Application of American Tobacco
Co.," the court heard the appeal of a contempt order against
nonparty researchers for their failure to comply with subpoenas
which requested research data on the hazards of smoking. At is-
sue was a second subpoena issued by the defendants, the first
subpoena having been held to pose "an unreasonable burden
upon the medical and scientific institutions involved .... "99 The
second subpoena sought fewer items than the first, "concentrat-
ing primarily on the computer tapes storing the relevant raw
data."100 The trial court rejected the nonparty's motion to
quash, based in part upon its interpretation of the issues deter-
mined by the court quashing the original subpoena, reasoning
further that New York discovery rules differed from their fed-
eral counterparts. 10 1 Observing that principles of issue preclu-
sion "have been applied in federal court to bar an attack on a
subpoena," the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that
"[w]here . . . the first subpoena has been quashed as overly
96. 148 Ariz. 571, 716 P.2d 28 (1986).
97. Id. at 574, 716 P.2d at 31.
98. 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989).
99. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 2d 282, 287-88, 518 N.Y.S.2d 729,
734 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
100. See American Tobacco, 880 F.2d at 1525.
101. Id.
1990]
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broad and a second subpoena is served which is clearly narrower
or more specific, New York law does not give preclusive effect to
the decision quashing the earlier subpoena. 1 0 2
6. Arbitration
In some jurisdictions there exist, by statute, required arbi-
tral processes to which claimants injured in vehicular accidents
must first resort. 03 As a general rule, arbitral awards pursuant
to a statutory program of arbitration for automobile negligence,
even where accepted by the claimant, will have no issue preclu-
sive effect on later claims between and among the same par-
ties. 04 Where, on the other hand, an arbitration forum provides
a party with an adversarial forum that is qualitatively, if not for-
mally, similar to that of a court of general jurisdiction, there is
authority approving dismissal of a party's later endeavor to reli-
tigate issues decided by the arbitrator.' 5
7. Consent Judgments, Stipulations, and Settlements
Prior judgments entered by consent are not ordinarily given
issue preclusive effect in a subsequent suit, on the logic that the
issues underlying the prior judgment were neither actually liti-
gated nor necessary and essential to the judgment. Like treat-
102. Id. at 1527. The court explained:
[T]he subpoenas at issue in the present case are plainly narrower than the sub-
poena's quashed [earlier]. For example, whereas the Page subpoenas requested the
raw data in its original form (e.g., interview notes, completed questionnaires, x-
rays), the present subpoenas seek only the computer tapes plus such information
as is necessary to interpret those tapes. Further, the present subpoenas, unlike the
Page subpoenas, do not seek information that pertains to events occurring subse-
quent to the periods covered by the published articles.
Since the two sets of subpoenas are significantly different, the district court
properly rejected the contention that enforcement of the present subpoenas was
precluded by the decision in [the earlier case] quashing the broader subpoenas.
Id.
103. E.g., Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 400-01, 519 A.2d 905, 906-07
(1986) (nonbinding, albeit mandatory arbitration proceedings for claims of vehicular neg-
ligence not intended to be final adjudications).
104. Id. at 400-01, 519 A.2d at 906-07.
105. E.g., Bailey v. Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins. Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 34,
36-37, 505 N.E.2d 908, 911-12 (1987) (plaintiff, a passenger injured in a vehicular acci-
dent, proceeded to arbitration against one of the driver's carriers and was awarded
damages).
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ment is usually accorded settlements. 06 However, in some cir-
cumstances, an action settled during the pendency of an appeal
may still be vested with preclusive effect. 107
Stipulations dismissing actions may, however, preclude liti-
gation of issues resolved therein where the language of the dis-
missal "indicate[s] the parties agreed that [an issue] should be
deemed conclusively established .. .
The compensatory component of a settlement is, of course,
issue preclusive. Defendants settling claims against injured per-
sons may be protected from subsequent third-party claims
lodged by defendants in a later action where the settlements
were entered in good faith.'0 9 A court's recognition of issue
preclusive effect in a prior settlement will not be vitiated by a
later determination that the dismissing court was the wrong fo-
rum in which to bring the action." 0
D. Nonmutual Issue Preclusion
1. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
Federal law has rejected the requirement of mutuality, i.e.,
the rule that neither party can enlist a prior judgment to pre-
106. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1986).
107. E.g., Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 907, 718
P.2d 920, 924, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558, 562 (1986) (the settlement occurring after affirmance
on appeal, although prior to expiration of the time for appeals to the state's highest
court, provided even greater indicia that the judgment was "the last word" of the render-
ing court (citing Sandoval v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 932, 936, 190 Cal. Rptr. 29,
31 (1983))).
108. Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (1986).
The court held that the absence of such indication in the dismissal obviated the city's
reliance upon dismissal to preclude issues in contractor's suit against the city for breach
of contract. Id. at 573, 716 P.2d at 30.
109. Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 753 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Mo. 1988).
110. Id. at 894.
The railroad argues that the trial court was in error in concluding that the
settlements had been reached in good faith. The Illinois appellate court expressly
rejected this contention. It could not be predicted, at the time the settlements
were entered into, that the courts of the forum state would ultimately conclude
that the case should have been brought someplace else. The settling defendants
were confronted with a very substantial trial, and each of them paid a seven figure
amount to dispose of the claim against it. The policy underlying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel calls for its application here, as to an issue expressly presented
to and decided by the Illinois courts.
Id. at 893.
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clude litigation of an issue unless both parties were bound by
that ruling."' While state law provides variable guidance, most
states have abandoned the mutuality requirement." 2 Authors of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments reached a conforming
conclusion. The current Restatement eliminates the requirement
of mutuality, adopting instead "a more flexible rule . . . which
emphasize[s] a discretionary weighing of economy against fair-
ness.""' Additionally, section 29 states that a party precluded
from relitigating an issue with an opposing party pursuant to
sections 27 and 28 is likewise precluded from doing so with a
stranger to the earlier litigation "unless the fact that he lacked
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or
other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to reli-
tigate the issue. '
When issue preclusion is asserted by a person not a party to
the initial litigation, the decisions and the Restatement both
111. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 332 (1971).
112. See Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 165, 549 A.2d 437, 438
(App. Div. 1988); East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. Freeman, 289 Ark. 539, 713 S.W.2d
456 (1986):
[C]ollateral estoppel requires four elements before a determination is conclusive in
a subsequent proceeding: 1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as
that involved in the prior litigation; 2) that issue must have been actually liti-
gated; 3) it must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and 4) the
determination must have been essential to the judgment.
289 Ark. at 543, 713 S.W.2d at 459; cf. Kearney v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 233 Kan. 492,
512, 665 P.2d 757, 774 (1983). In the earlier action,
all defendants fully litigated the issues of their respective liability and that case
has now been finally determined. Under the facts of these cases where there were
no claims by any defendants in any of the cases that any of the plaintiffs were
negligent or at fault and the only issues thereon were among the three codefend-
ants, there existed mutuality and identity of the parties sufficient to invoke col-
lateral estoppel in the later cases. We are not called upon and do not here decide
whether mutuality of estoppel is still a valid requirement for the application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel in other cases.
233 Kan. at 512-13, 665 P.2d at 774-75 (original emphasis).
113. See Kortenhaus, 228 N.J. Super. at 165, 549 A.2d at 438.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982); see, e.g., Sucher v. Kut-
scher's Country Club, 113 A.D.2d 928, 930, 493 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (1985) (following the
conclusion that the issue sought to be decided in the subsequent litigation is the same,
and that it was "necessarily determined" in the earlier action, the court stated that
"[t]he second part [of a collateral estoppel analysis] is an inquiry as to whether the party
sought to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the prior
proceeding.").
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grant correspondingly greater weight to the party opponent's
"fairness" arguments against granting estoppel effect.115 Section
29 of the Restatement describes one general and several particu-
lar circumstances to be evaluated in addition to those enumer-
ated in section 28.116 One federal court summarized the "fair-
ness" evaluation by posing these questions:
(1) Did the party to be estopped have incentive to vigorously
litigate the first action;
(2) if there is more than one judgment involved, are they
consistent;
(3) does the second action afford some procedural opportuni-
ties unavailable in the first action; and finally
(4) would application of issue preclusion otherwise be unfair
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment b (1982). The qualifica-
tions stated in section 28 apply to issue preclusion when it is invoked by a nonparty.
When a nonparty invokes issue preclusion, however, greater weight may be given to the
factors stated in section 28 and additional considerations may indicate the inappropri-
ateness of imposing preclusion.
See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1505, 1523
(D. Colo. 1989) (fairness considerations are brought into special focus where "wait and
see" claimants in mass tort litigation assert nonmutual offensive issue preclusion).
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 comments c-j (1982). These
circumstances include consideration of whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with
an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom preclusion
is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the
issue that were not available in the first action and could likely result in the issue
being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable
preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his
present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with an-
other determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among
the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action, or
apparently were based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determina-
tion of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another party
thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would
inappropriately foreclose opportunity to obtain reconsideration of the legal rule
upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be
permitted to relitigate the issue.
Id. § 29.
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to the defendant.1 7
To these questions a New York appellate court added:
"availability of new evidence, the use of initiative, the extent of
a prior litigation and the competence and experience of counsel
''118
The "full and fair" opportunity to litigate inures to the
party or the party's privies, and does not extend to the party's
counsel. In the context of defensive issue preclusion, one federal
trial court rejected a defendant asbestos ceiling tile manufac-
turer's request that the plaintiff school district be estopped from
pursuing its claims for punitive damages against defendant be-
cause plaintiff's counsel had earlier litigated and lost a compara-
ble claim on behalf of other plaintiffs.119
As in issue preclusion questions where there exists mutual-
ity, proponents of nonmutual issue preclusion have succeeded in
vesting preclusive effect in prior administrative determinations
where the party against whom preclusion is sought had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue. For example,
in Martin v. Ring,120 the court affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict for defendant homeowner in a worker's negligence action
arising from injuries suffered while working on the homeowner's
porch. The trial court's directed verdict was based on an earlier
Industrial Accident Board conclusion that plaintiff's injury was
not due to the fall from defendant's porch. The appellate court
concurred that the cause of plaintiff's back injury was both fully
and fairly litigated before the Board, and was essential to its
decision. 121
2. De Facto Privity
Where the party against whom preclusion is asserted was
not a party to the earlier action or actions, courts have been re-
luctant to impose issue preclusion merely because the parties to
the first action share an identity of interests with the parties in
117. Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D.N.J. 1989).
118. See Sucher, 113 A.D.2d at 930, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
119. Hebron Pub. School Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum Co., 723 F. Supp.
416 (D.N.D. 1989).
120. 401 Mass. 59, 514 N.E.2d 663 (1987).
121. Id. at 62-63, 514 N.E.2d at 665.
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the second. Claiming that such an analysis "stretches 'privity'
beyond meaningful limits," the Fifth Circuit in Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.2 ' identified three settings in which federal
courts would recognize virtual or de facto privity. The two set-
tings which are relevant to products liability actions are (1)
where the nonparty "'controlled the original suit' "; and (2)
where the nonparty's "'interests were represented adequately in
the original suit.' ",123 The criterion of adequate representation in
the prior suit has conventionally been limited to persons "some-
how represented" in the earlier litigation,'2 including "survi-
vors, spouses, executors and the like of former parties."''1 5 An
insured and an insurer will be considered to be in privity except
where "the interests of the insured and insurer are antagonistic
towards each other in an initial tort adjudication.' 2 6
Consistent with the above, successive products liability ac-
tions against different participants in the distributive chain
should not be barred by res judicata upon proponent's simple
claim that the retailer, wholesaler, and manufacturer are in priv-
ity.'2 7 Courts evaluating the relationship between and among the
manufacturer and downstream sellers rely instead upon the
"broader concept" 28 of issue preclusion to prevent successive
actions against retailers, manufacturers, and other sellers of the
same product where plaintiffs raise the same factual issues of
122. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
123. Id at 339. (quoting Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84,
95 (5th Cir. 1977)). The court in Hardy explains: "[Tihe rationale for these excep-
tions - all derived from Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 30, 31, 34, 39-41
(1982) - is obviously that in these instances the nonparty has in effect had his day in
court." Id.
124. See Hebron Pub. School Dist., 723 F. Supp. at 419.
125. Id.; see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
126. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Whatley, 558 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990). For a criticism of this rule see infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
127. Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 318 Pa. Super. 225, 233, 464 A.2d
1313, 1317 (1983). The court stated.
Privity for purposes of res judicata is not established by the mere fact that per-
sons may be interested in the same question or in proving the same facts. The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments applies principles of res judicata to different
parties where one is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another, such as
principal and agent or master and servant. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
51 (1982). In such cases there is, in an important sense, a single claim.
Id.
128. Id. at 235, 464 A.2d at 1318.
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defect or hazard that has been litigated previously.1 2 9
A recurring phenomenon in mass tort actions is the speciali-
zation of individual law firms in actions arising from the same
allegedly tortious conduct. Whether the subject matter is
pharmaceuticals, asbestos contamination, or otherwise, defend-
ants in a contemporary action may find themselves defending
against different claimants represented by the attorneys who
prosecuted earlier claims on behalf of other plaintiffs. In such
circumstances, defendants have sought to bar the later action on
the grounds that the repeated presence of the same counsel for
claimants constitutes plaintiffs' de facto representation in the
earlier litigation. Defendant manufacturer of asbestos ceiling
tiles raised this issue preclusion defense in Hebron Public
School District v. United States Gypsum Co., °30 where the
plaintiffs were represented by counsel who previously repre-
sented other plaintiffs who were disappointed in their claim for
punitive damages against the same defendant. 131 The North Da-
kota District Court refused to extend the concept of virtual rep-
resentation to plaintiffs whose counsel litigated an earlier action,
calling it both an unwarranted extension of issue preclusion by
earlier de facto representation beyond its conventional pre-
cincts" 2 and an impermissible limitation upon plaintiffs' choice
of counsel.133
129. E.g., Billman v. Nova Prods., 328 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (collat-
eral estoppel precludes litigation against manufacturer of issues previously litigated
against retailer); Meyer v. Droms, 68 A.D.2d 942, 944, 414 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1979) (the
same effect, with the first action brought against the manufacturer and the second
against the distributor).
130. 723 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.D. 1989).
131. Id. at 418-19.
132. Id. at 419. For example, barring claims by survivors, spouses, executors and the
like of former parties.
133. Id. The court noted:
It is important to remember that the case is that of the client: a lawyer only serves
as that client's advocate. Hebron cannot be bound by previous assertions of its
lawyers on cases with which Hebron had no involvement. To allow such a result
would only serve to limit the choice of legal aid available to parties. That the
choice of counsel is to be left to the discretion of the client is established within
our profession.
Id. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (1980) (agree-
ments restricting the practice of a lawyer are prohibited).
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3. New Evidence or Different Evidentiary Rules
Medical or scientific developments postdating the original
action and material to plaintiff's prima facie case of causation,
or defendant's response thereto, will suffice to permit a party's
relitigation of an issue. In Zweig v. E.R. Squibb and Sons,13 4 the
appellate court held that the prior jury verdict - that a drug
used to prevent miscarriages had caused birth defects in the na-
ture of limb reductions - did not collaterally estop the drug
manufacturer from denying the same allegation in a new action
in view of the new evidence that had developed since the previ-
ous litigation. The plaintiff, an infant born with reduced limbs
allegedly caused by his mother's ingestion of the drug while she
was pregnant, .appealed a lower court decision that permitted
the defendant to relitigate the issue of causation based on new
evidence. Finding the new evidence material, the court held that
where there was an absence of mutuality, issue preclusion should
be applied "with a lighter hand" and replaced with a "more flex-
ible approach" to limit application of the doctrine.1 35 Similarly,
plaintiffs in Vincent v. Thompson,"3 6 parents of a child who con-
tracted encephalopathy following administration of defendant
manufacturer's drug Quadrigen, defended, on appeal, the trial
court's preclusion of the defendant Parke Davis' evidence on the
issue of defect on the grounds that a prior suit had affirmed a
judgment that a defective condition in the drug caused another
plaintiff's illness and consequent brain damage.13 7 Among di-
verse reasons for finding the trial court in error, the New York
appellate court included the observation that, following the prior
action, medical procedures were developed that permitted con-
clusive testing for endotoxins which might leach from the dead
pertussis bacilli in Quadrigen, providing defendant with expert
evidence tending to disprove the presence of endotoxins "in any
quantity sufficient to cause an untoward reaction in a human
being."I'8
134. 222 N.J. Super. 306, 536 A.2d 1280 (App. Div. 1988).
135. Id. at 311-12, 536 A.2d at 1282-83.
136. 50A.D.2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1975).
137. Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1969).
138. See Vincent, 50 A.D.2d 211, 221, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 128 (1975). The court fur-
ther stated:
1990]
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Even without regard to divergent evidentiary rules, there is
authority holding that the court in a subsequent action may
deny issue preclusive effect to a prior ruling where the earlier
trial court entered evidentiary rulings that the later court con-
sidered prejudicial to a party. Significantly, section 29(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments has been interpreted to
permit a court in a subsequent action to review evidentiary rul-
ings of the first proceeding and, should it consider earlier rulings
both erroneous and material to the outcome, deny the judgment
issue preclusive effect. Reference may again be made to Zweig v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons,"9 where the New Jersey appellate court
affirmed a trial court's denial of preclusive effect to an earlier
Utah jury's finding that the drug Delalutin caused a child's limb
reduction. The New Jersey court concluded that the Utah jury's
consideration of "FDA-compelled" package inserts unfairly
prejudiced defendant. 4 0
4. Capacity to Join
As did the Supreme Court in Parklane,'4 the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments attaches significance to whether the
party proposing or opposing "unfavorable preclusion" could
have joined the present adversary in the first action by either
intervention or joinder. 4 2 The objective is to deny the advan-
tages of issue preclusion to persons who failed to exercise joinder
or intervention in the first action, choosing instead to lay "in
wait, hoping to exploit a favorable judgment with no risk of be-
ing bound by an unfavorable one.' 4  Decisions evaluating this
assessment require more than the technical opportunity for join-
der or intervention. They require that the opponent show that
To allow the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be used to deny to a defendant
in a case such as this an opportunity to introduce evidence clearly relevant to a
key issue in the case, the absence or existence of a causal relationship between the
claimed defect in the product ...and the injuries for which the plaintiffs are
suing, is the use of that doctrine to deny such a defendant a complete and fair
opportunity to litigate the very issue upon which its rights depend.
Id. at 221, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
139. 222 N.J. Super. 306, 536 A.2d 1280 (App. Div. 1988).
140. Id. at 312, 536 A.2d at 1283.
141. 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (1982).
143. Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1987).
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joinder or intervention would have been a manifestly reasonable
course for proponent. Murray v. Feight'" illustrates that the in-
quiry should not stop with the characterization of the initial ac-
tion, but should proceed as well to parse the discrete factual is-
sues decided thereunder. 145 In the- appeal, the court rejected
plaintiff's claim that the defendants should have brought their
tort and contract claims in the original lien priority litigation,
agreeing with the lower court that the later tort and contract
claims were "entirely foreign to the nature of the original
case."1 46 As meaningful was the Murray court's second rationale
for not estopping the proponent's application for issue preclu-
sion: the defendant's personal circumstances at the time of the
first action, including the loss of their baby daughter, would
make it most extraordinary for them to have begun "major liti-
gation at that time."' 4 Likewise, a prior party's failure to lodge
a permissive counterclaim in the initial action will not operate to
estop its later litigation of a factum probandum within the first
action. 4 8
144. Id. at 1155.
145. E.g., Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d
920, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1986). The court held that a prior determination pertinent to the
issue of vicarious liability, i.e., whether or not Noyes was an employee of Producers,
collaterally estopped a later dispute as to his status as an "employee" within the mean-
ing of an exclusion to the carrier's policy. The court held that the issue of employment
status determined in an antecedent tort action was indistinguishable from the interpre-
tation of employment status in the subsequent action alleging the carrier's breach of the
duty to defend. Id. at 911, 718 P.2d at 924, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 562. The court also
commented:
[T]here is no significant difference in meaning between the term "employee" as
used in the third party tort liability context and Sentry's insurance policy. The
employment status issue is identical in the two situations....
Because all the elements of collateral estoppel were met, we conclude that
appellants [herein] are precluded from relitigating the issue of whether Noyes was
an employee of Producers.
Id.
146. See Murray, 741 P.2d at 1154.
147. Id. at 1155.
148. East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. Freeman, 289 Ark. 539, 713 S.W.2d 456
(1986). In that case, defendant East Texas Motor Freight sought to bar Ms. Freeman's
personal injury claims against the carrier because Ms. Freeman had intervened in the
original action against a farmer whose field burning created a road hazard and conse-
quent highway accident. Finding that Ms. Freeman was free to press her claims in state
court, notwithstanding an earlier federal judgment finding the farmer entirely at fault,
the court explained:
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5. Nonmutual Defensive Preclusion
The doctrine of issue preclusion can be used defensively by
a defendant against a plaintiff who had previously "litigated and
lost. ' 149 Acceptance of this doctrine is tied principally to the
economies its application achieves, for courts and litigants alike,
as defensive issue preclusion will often operate to dispose of an
entire action. 15 0 Courts endorsing nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion have required that:
(1) the issues in both proceedings must be identical, (2) the issue
in the prior proceeding must have been actually litigated and ac-
tually decided, (3) there must have been a full and fair opportu-
nity for litigation in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previ-
ously litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and
final judgment on the merits.""
For example, in Johnson v. Eli Lilly & Co.' 52 ["Johnson II"], an
action against a drug manufacturer for injuries sustained by
plaintiff as a result of her mother's ingestion of DES during
pregnancy, the court held that the judgment in one of two ear-
lier actions brought by plaintiff against the same manufacturer
should have preclusive effect. The court found that the prior ac-
tion contained the same issue to be decided in the subsequent
proceeding, i.e., "whether the decision in Johnson I precludes an
action brought on the same facts under the New York revivor
Here, .. . Mrs. Freeman was joined [in the federal action] only for purposes of
contribution. Mrs. Freeman was not obligated to counter-claim against ETMF in
the federal action because of her pending state claim. See F.R.C.P. 13(a). More-
over, the attempt to consolidate her claims pending in state court with the federal
action was rejected by the federal judge. Hence, the issues involving the liability
of ETMF for the injuries and property claims of the appellees, [including Mrs.
Freeman], had not been litigated prior to the trial in Crittenden County.
Id. at 543, 713 S.W.2d at 459.
149. See generally Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill
Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REV. 141,
149 (1985).
150. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 55:14 (T. Travers 3d ed. 1987).
151. Johnson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 689 F. Supp. 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Gelb v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1986)); cf Fireside Motors v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 395 Mass. 366, 372, 479 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 n.6 (1985) (where the supreme judicial
court states the general requirement of party mutuality and notes that they have permit-
ted nonmutual application of collateral estoppel where there has been a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue).
152. 689 F. Supp. 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
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statute." 53
The courts uniformly hold that the issue for which preclu-
sion is sought must be identical to that decided in the earlier
proceeding. For example, in Sucher v. Kutscher's Country
Club, 54 an action arising from a club patron's fall from a chair
lift, plaintiff brought suit against the country club which, in
turn, impleaded the vendor who, in turn, impleaded the manu-
facturer, American Starr Glider Corporation. The vendor and
the manufacturer were granted summary judgment. The country
club did not appeal, but filed a new third-party complaint
against the manufacturer, alleging the chairlift was "placed...
'into the stream of commerce in a defective and dangerous con-
dition.' "" American Starr Glider moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on grounds of collateral estoppel, citing the grant of sum-
mary judgment in the first action. Noticing that the prior action
involved the manufacturer as a fourth party, not brought in by
the present plaintiff, the Second Department concluded that the
particular issue of unreasonable danger and defective condition
had not yet been litigated. 5" In addition, the court noted the
club's introduction of new evidence, a design evaluation report
not proposed until three months after decision on the earlier
summary judgment motion, and held that "on this record, it was
an improvident exercise of discretion to apply collateral estoppel
to bar the instant complaint.' 5 7
Defensive issue preclusion will not be applied where the
court discerns that its operation would deprive the claimant of a
full and fair hearing. In Lynch v. Merrell-National Laborato-
ries, 5 the First Circuit, in considering the effect of summary
judgment for the manufacturer in a prior federal court decision
on a later state court suit, declined to preclude plaintiffs' litiga-
tion of the issue because plaintiffs had not had a "fair opportu-
nity to litigate [because] they understood that their withdrawal
from the consolidated action would not prejudice them." 59 The
153. Id. at 174.
154. 113 A.D.2d 928, 493 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1985).
155. Id. at 929, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
156. Id. at 931, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
157. Id. at 933, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
158. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (a Bendectin action).
159. Id. at 1191. In that action, a Massachusetts plaintiff agreed to transfer her case
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court stated that plaintiffs' "freedom to withdraw" from the
original suit and file the action anew in Boston "was not
illusory."'160
6. Offensive Nonmutual Preclusion
The Supreme Court first countenanced offensive nonmutual
preclusion in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,'6' a securities fraud
case. There the Court adopted a two-prong test to allow plain-
tiffs in a stockholder class action, who were strangers to the first
lawsuit, to estop the defendants from relitigating whether a
proxy statement was false and misleading. The Court considered
whether the plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier ac-
tion and whether any unfairness to the defendant might result
before it decided to apply the estoppel. Significantly, the Court
stated that the apparent virtues of permitting defensive use of
issue preclusion are less evident in its offensive application, giv-
ing only "guarded endorsement"'6 s to offensive use of issue pre-
clusion due to its vulnerability to plaintiff abuse.'0 3
In products liability litigation, nonmutual offensive issue
to Ohio for consolidated discovery. When given the option, at a later date, to remove the
case to Massachusetts, plaintiff opted to do so. The consolidated cases proceeded to trial
in Ohio, where the jury found for the defendant. In Massachusetts, defendant then
moved for summary judgment based upon issue preclusion. Plaintiff-appellant appealed
from the trial court's entry of summary judgment.
160. Id. at 1193.
161. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
162. See id. at 328.
163. Id. at 329-30. The Court explained:
[O]ffensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the
same manner as defensive use does .... Offensive use of collateral estoppel, [does
not create a strong incentive to join all adversaries in the first action, but rather]
creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to rely upon
a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment
if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a
favorable judgment. Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase
rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will
have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action.
Id. (citations omitted).
In products liability suits, the converse may be more true. Historical judicial parsi-
mony in permitting nonmutual offensive issue preclusion often cannot be reconciled with
practical considerations of fairness in many products liability actions. See discussion in-
fra at Conclusion.
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preclusion has bolstered claimants' actions against defendant
manufacturers and sellers. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
Jeppesen & Co.,164 the court allowed insurance companies,
which acted as subrogees of an airline that settled actions by the
heirs of airline passengers killed in an airline crash, to assert col-
lateral estoppel against the manufacturer of an approach plate
used by the pilots even though they were not parties to the first
action. The court held the cases involved identical issues of
whether the manufacturer produced a faulty approach plate,
whether its use by the pilots was the proximate cause of the
crash, and whether the pilots were guilty of contributory negli-
gence in their use of the approach plate.
From the general issue preclusion rule requiring an unam-
biguous prior finding of fact,166 it follows a fortiori that inconsis-
tent prior holdings upon the same issue militates against grant-
ing preclusive effect. Consistently, in the appeal of an action in
which a manufacturer of DES sought to litigate certain issues,
including causation, relating to its liability for injuries allegedly
caused to the plaintiff by the use of the drug by the plaintiff's
mother, plaintiffs sought to use the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel to preclude the defendant manufacturer's introduction of ev-
idence on these issues on the grounds.they were "fully" litigated
at a prior trial. The trial court allowed the preclusion. On ap-
peal, the court in Kortenhaus *v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' 66 held that
while collateral estoppel is a rule of efficiency and may be ap-
plied in products liability actions, it is fundamental to its use
that the earlier decision be reliable and substantially correct.'67
The New Jersey appeals court pointed out that jury verdicts re-
garding the manufacturer's liability had been inconsistent in
prior verdicts, adding that "application of offensive collateral es-
toppel in the face of inconsistent verdicts is antithetical to the
very basis of the rule ....
The Supreme Court in Parklane and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments section 29(2) '(1982), alike, state that non-
164. 440 F. Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1977).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
166. 228 N.J. Super. 162, 549 A.2d 437 (App. Div. 1988).
167. Id. at 166, 549 A.2d at 439.
168. Id. at 168, 549 A.2d at 440.
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mutual offensive issue preclusion may be in appropriate where
the opponent can demonstrate that, in the prior forum, it suf-
fered from procedural or evidential disabilities that were out-
come determinative in the sense that in the latter forum the op-
ponent might, under different procedure or rule of law, secure a
different result. 189 In United States v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals
Corp., ' 7 0 an in rem action involving the pharmaceutical manu-
facturer's product Fiorinal with Codeine, the trial court ruled
that the manufacturer was collaterally estopped from litigating
the issue of whether the product was a "new drug" within the
meaning of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.171 The court en-
tered a permanent injunction and ordered the product seized
and destroyed, and the manufacturer appealed. The Sixth Cir-
cuit applied a materiality standard to respondent pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer's argument that the prior New Jersey proceed-
ing failed to provide a full and fair opportunity for it to prove
that the product was not a "new drug," concluding that "there is
no evidence that the New Jersey forum was more inconvenient
than Ohio or that it deprived Sandoz of any procedural opportu-
nities available in Ohio. '17 2
E. Discrete Fairness Questions in Products Liability Issue
Preclusion
The discussion above provides a backdrop for the author's
suggestion that the fairness of issue preclusion is particularly
questionable in three areas distinctive to tort and products lia-
bility litigation.
1. Claimant Knowledge or Expertise Affecting Degree of
Risk
In both offensive and defensive issue preclusion contexts,
fact-specific qualities of the risk to claimant and the cause of
claimant's injury often invite the conclusion that preclusive ef-
fect should not be granted a prior judgment. For example, in
169. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(2)
(1982).
170. 894 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1990).
171. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (Supp. 1990).
172. 894 F.2d at 828 (citing Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332).
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Deviner v. Electrolux Motor,1 73 the appellate court reviewed the
district court's denial of appellant's motion for a directed verdict
based upon issue preclusion, relying upon an earlier decision by
the same court upholding a jury finding of defectiveness in the
same model of defendant's chain saw.174 In approving the trial
court's denial of a directed verdict, the Eleventh Circuit stated
its unwillingness to grant unmeasured expansion of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel beyond its original precincts.' 7  Regarding
chain saw design defect litigation in particular, the court con-
cluded that for such products, factual distinctions in the circum-
stances giving rise to claimants' injuries compromised the confi-
dence that could be reposed in any single prior verdict. Among
other variables, the court mentioned "the skill, experience, con-
ditions in the workplace, objectives to be accomplished in execu-
tion of the task at hand, and modus operandi of the chain saw
operator in each instance.' 7
Comparable considerations led the Ohio Supreme Court in
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.' 7 to suggest the
unsuitability of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel on the
issue of defective design for mass-produced products "when the
injuries arise out of distinct underlying incidents.'17 8 In Good-
son, suit was brought on behalf of a four-year-old child who was
injured when her foot slipped beneath a riding lawnmower. At
trial, plaintiffs moved successfully for summary judgment
against the manufacturer on the issue of the manufacturer's de-
sign liability, citing an earlier holding involving similar injuries
in which a jury found McDonough Power Equipment liable for
negligent design in failing to properly guard the mower's rotat-
173. 844 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1988)..
174. Nettles v. Electrolux Motor, 784 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986).
175. Deviner, 844 F.2d 769. The court noted:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel developed in patent cases and is useful in
preventing the relitigation of questions once thoroughly canvassed and deter-
mined, such as the validity of a patent. It should not be extended indiscriminately
to tort cases where the factual circumstances in each case differ and no hard and
fast legal standard has emerged from the developing case law.
Id. at 774 (footnotes omitted).
176. Id.
177. 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983).
178. Id. at 204, 443 N.E.2d at 988.
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ing blade. 179 Noting first the general factors a court might con-
sider in determining the suitability of nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion,180 the Ohio Supreme Court stated that a court's diffi-
culties in concluding that "the identical issue was actually de-
cided in the former case" 181 are "multiplied" in design defect lit-
igation "where the issue determined in the first litigation relates
to a product's design.' 1 82 At the threshold, differences in the
negligence law of Ohio and that of Florida, the forum of the ear-
lier suit would affect "the differing trial techniques and appel-
late determinations that would have been made by legal counsel
.... '18 The Court continued by stating various accident-spe-
cific issues that might affect the degree of risk posed by the
product, including: "different operators of the equipment with
perhaps totally different mechanical capabilities [and] different
terrain and weather conditions ....
179. Id. at 194, 443 N.E.2d at 980 (citing Harrison v. McDonough Power Equip., 381
F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1974)) (denying motion for judgment n.o.v.).
180. Id. at 201, 443 N.E.2d at 986. The court summarized the following "factors" as
appropriate for consideration:
There are the tangible, as well as the intangible, elements which have their mean-
ingful effect upon the result of any cause, the nature of the claim and the claim-
ants, as well as the nature of the defendant; the amount involved in such claim;
the manner of the advocacy, often depending upon the amounts involved in such
cause; the philosophical elements surrounding the cause; the agreed settlement, if
any, in the matter; the vast differences between juries and their determinations of
issues of liability and damages; and the unwillingness to appeal a verdict, if such
would not be feasible.
Id.
181. Id. at 203, 443 N.E.2d at 987 (citing 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4416-17 (1981)).
182. Id. The court explains:
This is due to the nature of the questions and the potentially broad impact of
their resolution. These questions are very technical, requiring expert testimony to
bring out the specifics. Also, a jury's ultimate determination requires delicate bal-
ancing between the design decisions actually made by the manufacturer and those
which are postulated as feasible within the industry at any given point in time.
Id.
183. Id. at 203-04, 443 N.E.2d at 988.
184. Id.
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2. Privity
a. The Insurer-Insured Relationship
In products liability litigation, the actual, as distinct from
formal, relationship between an insurance carrier and its insured
raises genuine concerns about the presumptive privity relation-
ship between them. The virtues apparent in finding a privity re-
lationship in furtherance of the single recovery rule"'5 or the
rules governing joinder of parties8 6 are altogether absent in a
variety of other carrier-insured relationships. Counsel with any
significant contact with insurer-insured litigation know that the
insured's relationship with the carrier is, in turn, remote and
fragile. In the realities of primary litigation against a tortfeasor
and insurance declaratory judgment actions alike, the carrier
and the insured are in privity only in the technical, contractual
sense. In a primary action against the tortfeasor, brought nomi-
nally by the insured but actually by the carrier, the insurer en-
joys virtually complete authority over the conduct of the litiga-
tion, with which the insured trammels only at the risk of having
the carrier deem him noncooperative.18 7 The sprawling national
litigation brought by insured sellers of asbestos, pharmaceuticals
and other products against their insurers seeking declaratory
judgment as to the carrier's duties to defend and indemnify '88
185. See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 15 Conn. App. 392, 546 A.2d 284
(1988). The court noted: "the present case involves the issues of whether defensive col-
lateral estoppel principles and whether the paramount principle of tort law that a plain-
tiff may be compensated only once for his injuries should be employed." Id. at 396-97
n.5, 546 A.2d at 287 n.5. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court confirmed that sat-
isfaction of the one judgment foreclosed plaintiff from further litigating claims for the
same injuries. Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 68-70, 557 A.2d 540, 542-44
(1989). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 48, at 330-31 (5th ed. 1984).
186. E.g., Childers v. Eastern Foam Prods., 94 F.R.D. 53 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
187. E.g., Daniel v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 1032 (R.I. 1986). The court
found: "Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff without consider-
ing the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, the trial justice prop-
erly concluded that since plaintiff neither substantially complied with nor cooperated
with defendant insurer, she was barred from recovery under the policy." Id.
188. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 1986 Fire &
Casualty (CCH) 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1986):
Plaintiff argues that the Pre-Revision Policies should be interpreted so that cover-
age would be triggered when "exposure" to DES occurred during a policy period..
. Defendant contends that those of its policies which provided coverage for prod-
uct liabilities for "accidents" occurring during a policy year were triggered when
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support the argument that a carrier's relationship with its in-
sured is one of privity in only a formal sense.
The chimerical nature of carrier "privity" with insureds or
third-party beneficiaries is highlighted in Costa v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co.,189 a decision laudable in its candor if not its
fairness. In Costa, plaintiff below, an employee injured while
working his employer's "mangle" machine, successfully pursued
his workers' compensation remedies and received medical pay-
ments, disability payments, rehabilitation services, and a lump
sum settlement from Liberty Mutual, the workers' compensation
carrier. Liberty Mutual never advised Costa, who consulted no
independent lawyer, of his potential remedy in products liability
against Morrison Textile Machinery Co., the manufacturers of
the "mangle" machine. "Liberty's tepid enthusiasm for pursuing
Morrison was understandable," the appeals court later noted, for
Liberty Mutual "was also Morrison's insurer."19°
After learning that his potential claim against the manufac-
turer was barred by the applicable limitations period, Mr. Costa
sued Liberty Mutual, claiming that the carrier breached a duty
to advise him of his right to pursue independently a claim
against Morrison. Rebuffing the employee's claim, the appeals
court stated that the state's workers' compensation scheme "ap-
parently assumed an adversary relationship between the insurer
and the employee claimant, rather than a fiduciary relation-
ship," and concluded also that the applicable statute "does not
seem to contemplate that the insurer will give tutorial on the
subject [of potential independent actions against the manufac-
turer] to the employee." '' Putting aside the venality of Costa,
the limited fact finding objectives of workers' compensation
tribunals tacitly discourage employee claimants from preparing
and presenting evidence and legal argument that look beyond
the findings of the administrative board to their potential
preclusive effect upon later independent tort claims. 92 Given its
an injury manifested itself, not when an insured's drug is used by a claimant.
Id. at 1354-55.
189. 29 Mass. App. Ct. 176, 558 N.E.2d 999 (1990).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See infra notes 202-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of issue preclu-
sion and workers' compensation proceedings.
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due, Costa cuts further against the argument that a workers'
compensation proceeding provides an employee with the oppor-
tunity and incentive to fully and fairly litigate claims that might
be pursued in any later products liability action.
b. Spousal Privity and Derivative Claims for Loss of
Consortium
In tort actions, one spouse's personal injury suit against a
product seller may be accompanied by the other spouse's claim
for loss of consortium. 193 The consortium claim for "loss of con-
jugal fellowship and sexual relations"19' is considered derivative
of the personal injury claim, 1 "5 and, in most jurisdictions, the
consortium loss claimant will be time-barred if the action is not
brought within the limitations period applicable to the personal
injury claimant. 1"e
A conventional recognition of spousal privity in a products
liability issue preclusion context is Johnston v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp.,197 where a Missouri appellate court held that an adverse
jury verdict on a spouse's claim for loss of consortium precluded
her direct claim for personal injuries suffered when the defend-
ant's farm implement carrier disengaged from its towing vehicle
and struck their car. In the appeal of that action, the appellate
court found that the trial court erroneously prevented the jury
from hearing the physical injury claim of Mary Johnston,1 8 but
declined to order a new trial because, in the court's view, the
adverse jury verdict on her husband's strict liability claim and
193. See generally Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1977).
194. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 385, 525 P.2d 669, 670, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765, 766 (1974).
195. See generally STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY, PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH Ac-
TIONS Ch. 13 (1972).
196. J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, 3 MODERN TORT LAW § 29.17 (1990) ("The same statute of
limitations which applies to the impaired spouse's claim may also apply to the deprived
spouse's consortium claim." (citing Titze v. Miller, 337 N.W.2d 176 (S.D. 1983)));
cf. Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash. 2d 761, 733 P.2d 530 (1987) (spouse's
claim in loss of consortium accrues when she experiences her compensable loss, not nec-
essarily contemporaneous with the onset of injury of the physically impaired spouse).
197. 736 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987).
198. Id. at 548 ("[T]here was enough evidence from the surrounding circumstances
and the lack of prior medical history to make Mary's claim submissible.").
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her "derivative" claim in loss of consortium "foreclosed any
right to relief" from either the manufacturer or the distributor
of the towing vehicle. 9 '
In Johnston, both husband and wife suffered physical in-
jury. In the setting of a particular litigation, therefore, it was not
unreasonable to conclude that, the trial court's error withal,
both husband and wife had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue of the claimed defective condition of the towing vehi-
cle. Therein resides the logic of binding the wife by the
factfinder's conclusion that the husband failed to prove strict li-
ability. As or more frequently, the consortium claimant will not
have been physically injured in the mishap, and will instead pur-
sue a consortium claim for intangible loss that is secondary 00 to
the physical injury claim of the other spouse. In this latter set-
ting, courts should not assume the consortium claimant's virtual
representation by the physically injured spouse as a justification
for granting preclusive effect to one or more resolutions reached
in the first judgment.
In the context of ordinary civil litigation, the consortium
party's claim is parasitic to that of the personally injured
spouse. Given the consortium claimant's altogether different evi-
dentiary burden in the original action, 01 it would be most un-
usual for the consortium claimant to introduce evidence of the
dangerously defective nature of the product and its causal con-
nection with the other claimant's personal injuries. Taken to-
gether with the practical primacy vested in the physical injury
claim, these considerations commend reevaluation of any rule
binding a consortium claimant by issues determined as to cause
or causes of action for physical injury.
199. Id.
200. The term "secondary" is used in its strategic, rather than legal sense. The con-
sortium claim is secondary in that the parties, counsel, and the fact finder ordinarily
consider the claim of liability for physical injury to be the principal cause of action.
201. The consortium spouse's evidentiary burden is typically that of showing dam-
age to qualities of the marital relationship that have been summarized as including "the
loss of love, companionship, society, sexual relations, and household services." Borer v.
American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 443, 563 P.2d 858, 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1977).
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3. Quasi-Judicial Determinations
The majority of workers' compensation administrative
boards are charged with determining whether contested compen-
sation claims involved injury suffered or disease contracted "in
the course of and arising out of [the claimant's] employment. '20 2
The workers' compensation model represents two principal bar-
gained-for exchanges: (1) in exchange for a relatively prompt
compensation for actual expenses associated with work-related
injuries, the employee forbears any claim in negligence against
the employer; and (2) in exchange for immunity from negligence
claims brought by injured workers, employers underwrite an es-
sentially no-fault compensation scheme for out-of-pocket costs
of work-related injury.20 3
Although workers' compensation boards are court-like "in
legal effect,"2 4 to accomplish the principal goal of compensation,
administrative procedures in workers' compensation make sub-
stantial accommodations to economy and celerity. The jurisdic-
tion of the workers' compensation tribunal is limited to findings
of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to whether the claim
arose "out of and in the course of employment. ' 205 Explicit limi-
tations are placed upon the appellate review of board findings of
202. E.g., D.C. CODE § 36-301(12)(Rev. 1988), which provides:
"Injury" means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment, and such occupational. disease or infection as arises naturally out of
such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental in-
jury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of third persons directed
against an employee because of his employment.
See generally J. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 9-11 (1987).
203. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 36-304(a), (b) (1988), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The liability of an employer . . . shall be exclusive and in place of all
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband 'or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law on account of such injury or death.
(b) The compensation to which an employee is entitled under this chapter
shall constitute the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer ... for any
illness, injury, or death arising out of and in the course of his employment ....
See generally J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS Ch. 9 (1987).
204. 2B A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 77A.26 at 15-17 (1988) (quot-
ing Frement Indem. Corp. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 153 Cal. App. 3d 965, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 762 (1984)).
205. Cf. NACKLEY, supra note 202, at 59 ("The power of a state workers' compensa-
tion agency to hear disputes is limited by the terms of the applicable state statute and
by due process of law and other constitutional restrictions.").
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fact.2 6 In the proceedings themselves, a "rule of informality"
obtains, and thus, compared with proceedings before courts of
general jurisdiction, workers' compensation boards employ gen-
erally relaxed rules of notice and pleading.07
Hearsay and even incompetent evidence is admissible,08
and indeed, the rules of evidence are so relaxed that workers'
compensation findings are more likely to be reversed for failure
to admit evidence than for denying admission to evidence.09
Employee claimants frequently appear on their own behalt,
without counsel. 210
The specialized role of workers' compensation as a compen-
sation system administered by agencies in a quasi-judicial capac-
ity should disable any issue preclusive effect of such judgments
in later tort actions against the manufacturer or other third par-
ties. Agency findings and appellate affirmations that an injury
was, or was not, sustained in the course of employment, merit
conclusive effect, as ceding to compensation panels finality in
deciding this issue is integral to the bargained-for exchange be-
tween employee and employer to forego tort remedies in return
for expedited compensation for work-related injuries. However,
grave fairness questions arise from giving preclusive effect to any
other holdings a board may consider within its ancillary jurisdic-
tion. 211 In deciding the work-relatedness of an injury, for exam-
ple, a board may have to reach conclusions on issues such as
identification of the product or instrumentality causing claim-
ant's injury, or the claimant's incautious conduct short of inten-
206. NACKLEY, supra note 202, at 7, 77-78 ("[A]ppealable issues are often limited to
allowance of claims or of medical conditions.").
207. See LARSON, supra note 204, § 77A.00, at 15-1 ("Compensation procedure is
generally as summary and informal as is compatible with an orderly investigation of the
merits.").
208. Id. § 79.11, at 15-426.33 to 15-426.36 (incompetent evidence admissible).
209. Id. § 79.12, at 15-426.42 ("Ordinarily the only way in which a mistake on ad-
missibility as such could amount to reversible error would be by the exclusion of admissi-
ble evidence, rather than by the admission of incompetent evidence.").
210. See, e.g., Fisher v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ariz. App. 155, 510 P.2d 1060 (1973)
(claimant's self-representation not grounds for reversal).
211. It is accepted generally that a compensation panel may decide issues ancillary
to its findings concerning work-relatedness where such findings are necessary to support
its rationale. See NACKLEY, supra note 202, at 59 ("[r]esolution of issues that are neces-
sary incidents to other powers granted... will be upheld as 'clearly implied,' even if such
power was not expressly granted by statute.").
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tional misconduct.212 It does not, however, follow that findings
on such ancillary matters should be accorded preclusive effect in
later tort actions, for given the primary purpose, the limited par-
ties, and the informality of workers' compensation proceedings,
it would be quite unlikely for a claimant to anticipate and assert
or defend fact issues solely because of the potential relevance of
such issues in a later tort action against third parties.
The indefensible nature of such an approach is illustrated in
Brown v. Dow Chemical Co., s1 a tort action in which plaintiff
claimed that his workplace exposure to the chemical compound
dibromochlorpropane (DBCP) rendered him sterile.1 In his
preceding claim for workers' compensation, Brown prevailed
before the Administrative Law Judge, only to have the Arkansas
Workers' Compensation Commission reverse, on the grounds
that, in the underlying trial-type proceeding, Brown had failed
to establish "a causal connection between his exposure to the
DBCP and his lowered fertility. 2 1 5 Upon appeal to the Arkansas
Court of Appeals, the Compensation Commission's reversal was
undisturbed. 216 Thereafter, Brown and his wife sued Dow Chem-
ical Company, co-holder of the patent for the chemical, in strict
liability and negligence. Dow moved successfully for summary
judgment, with the federal trial court agreeing that Brown was
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of Dow's causal
contribution to his injury. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed, finding that the Compensation Commission "made a
conclusive finding as to the causation issue. "217
The unfairness of binding Brown by the Commission's ob-
servations on "causation" is betrayed by simple review of the
212. In most jurisdictions compensation may be denied to claimants whose conduct
is intentional or willful. E.g., D.C. CODE § 36-303(d) (1981) ("Liability for compensation
shall not apply where injury to the employee was occasioned solely by his intoxication or
by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.").
213. 875 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1989).
214. Within the first year of taking employment at Velsico Chemical's El Dorado,
Arkansas facility, Brown was advised that "exposure to DBCP might lead to sterility."
Id. at 198.
215. Id. at 199 (quoting the Commission's judgment).
216. Id. at 198.
217. Id. at 199. The appellate court added that even if, for the sake of argument,
"the administrative order were not entitled to preclusive effect, the reviewing court's
[the Arkansas Court of Appeals] decision would be." Id.
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means by which the employee pressed his claim before the
agency. Brown's solitary proffer of expert evidence on the causa-
tion issue was a written "Summary Report" from a Dr. Meyer,
Director of the Occupational Health Clinic at the University of
Cincinnati Medical School. In the Report, Dr. Meyer stated that
Brown's sterility "occurred directly as a result of [his exposure]
to high concentrations of DBCP" at his place of employment. 18
Before the Board, Brown's proof was arguably well-suited as evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding in a workers' compensation
proceeding, and indeed, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in
Brown's favor. However, his evidence scarcely resembled, in ei-
ther quality or quantum, what a toxic tort plaintiff would pre-
sent in a products liability suit. The deduction is inescapable
that in the agency proceeding Brown did not anticipate the po-
tential issue preclusive effect of the agency's holding. Nor, for
that matter, should he reasonably have been expected to.
In its seeming invitation for full-regalia litigation of com-
plex causation issues in workers' compensation proceedings, the
implications of Brown loom large. The better rule would be to
confine the issue preclusive effect of workers' compensation deci-
sions to issues necessary to the boards' objectives, i.e., determi-
nations of jurisdiction, existence of the employment relation,
character of the employment, the employer's insured status, and
the work-relatedness of the injury or disease.219
III. Conclusion
Nonmutual defensive issue preclusion is more likely than its
offensive counterpart to trench upon plaintiff's right to pursue
tort or warranty remedies for personal injury or property loss.
Conversely, nonmutual offensive issue preclusion should enjoy
expanded application, and can do so in harmony with the recog-
nized objectives of judicial economy and fairness to the litigants.
These propositions are based primarily upon recognition
that individual products liability claimants are rarely equally
circumstanced with defendants. The individual plaintiff and his
counsel, or even carrier counsel, is more likely to approach the
218. Id. at 198.
219. See LARSON, supra note 204, § 15-426.272(65)-(80).
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initial action with the laudable, but limited, objective of ob-
taining compensation for plaintiff's injuries. In prominent mass
claims against sellers of notoriously hazardous products, lead
counsel may have developed the resources and expertise to fash-
ion a litigation strategy that will advantage present and future
claimants alike. In most suits, however, the transitory involve-
ment of plaintiff's counsel with the product-specific subject mat-
ter makes it unlikely that decisions as to claims, evidence, settle-
ment or appeals will contemplate the effect of the original action
upon claims and issues advanced by claimants in later actions.
Conversely, it would be rare for the defense counsel of a national
manufacturer or marketer to fail to review every litigation deci-
sion with an eye towards the effect upon later and similar law-
suits that may be anticipated from any systemic product
problem.
Whether or not one accepts these observations, application
of the related doctrines of res judicata and issue preclusion oper-
ate effectively to limit litigation time and expense to that neces-
sary to afford justice to the parties. The contribution of issue
preclusion to the objectives of judicial economy and fairness to
the parties would be enhanced by the express recognition of cer-
tain qualities unique to products liability litigation.
As discussed above, products liability-specific questions af-
fecting the appropriateness of precluding issue relitigation arise
most frequently in two contexts. First, issue resolution in design
defect or failure to warn actions in which the knowledge, exper-
tise or conduct of the particular claimant affect the degree of
risk posed by the product is less suited to application of issue
preclusion than is issue resolution in actions where the product
risk is uniform, rendering the individual claimant's knowledge or
circumspection irrelevant. It follows that neither offensive nor
defensive issue preclusion is ordinarily appropriate where plain-
tiff knowledge or conduct operates to enlarge or diminish the
risk of product use.
Second, application of orthodox privity criteria to bar sub-
sequent issue litigation by parties technically, but not opera-
tively, in privity with parties to earlier suits, beclouds considera-
tion of the estopped party's actual earlier opportunity and
incentive to litigate. Any presumption of the alignment of a
spousal consortium claimant's litigation strategy with that of the
1990]
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physically injured spouse is based more upon the common law
fiction of the husband and wife as a legal unity than upon prac-
tical analysis of contemporary personal injury litigation. In addi-
tion, the Potemkin village quality of carrier-insured privity mili-
tates against automatically binding an insured by an issue
previously resolved against a carrier. Where issue preclusion
against an insured is predicated upon determinations made in
earlier litigation controlled and conducted by the carrier, re-
newed litigation of issues should only be barred upon the court's
specific finding that the insured's motive and opportunity to
contest the issue previously concluded was, in the context of the
particular suit, coextensive with that of the carrier. Lastly, to
the extent that workers' compensation findings purport to de-
cide issues of design or formulation defect, warning adequacy,
degree of risk, or product identification, such findings should not
be given issue preclusive effect in later products liability or toxic
tort claims against a manufacturer or seller.
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